It is suggested that authoritarianism as a personality trait might influence obedience pressure behavior (see DeZoort & Lord, 1994). Previous studies (e.g. [Chenhall, 1986], [Feather et al., 2001] and [Feather and Deanna, 2000]) suggest that high and low authoritarian individuals differ in the way they process and integrate information. For example, Chenhall (1986) suggests that effective information exchange in participative budgeting systems will be determined by homogenous authoritarian dyads between subordinates and superiors. Participation is found to be strongly associated with subordinate job satisfaction and budgetary attitude in homogenous, rather than heterogeneous, dyads. Feather and Deanna, 2000 N.T. Feather and O. Deanna, Reactions to penalties for an offence in relation to ethnic identity, responsibility and authoritarianism, Australian Journal of Psychology 52 (1) (2000), pp. 9–16. Full Text via CrossRef | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (9)Feather and Deanna (2000) find that high authoritarians are less likely to consider information related to the offender's situation when making judgments about how much punishment an offender deserves.7 High authoritarians tend to impose penalties indiscriminately, although to some extent there is a mitigating factor in which low responsibility offenders warrant less severe punishment. Low authoritarians, on the other hand, take the responsibility factor into account, judging the offender with diminished responsibility to be less guilty. Similarly, Feather et al. (2001) find that judgments made by high and low authoritarian individuals will vary depending on the different types of information available.8 High authoritarian individuals are more sensitive and responsive to information about legitimate authority. On the other hand, low authoritarian individuals are less sensitive and responsive to the information on legitimate authority but more sensitive and responsive to information about risk awareness. Hence low authoritarian individuals tend to blame the company if it is aware of the possible consequences of its new procedures, even if these procedures originate from higher authority.
DeZoort and Lord (1994) suggest that high authoritarian individuals tend to act in response to others who hold authoritative positions and to others who occupy higher positions (see also Sanford, 1956). Low authoritarian personalities, on the other hand, are characterized as individuals who are reluctant to deal with situational and interpersonal factors such as "authority-based instruction" unnecessarily, so that their decisions tend to be heavily reliant on their individual feelings and values and what they perceive to be correct and appropriate (DeZoort & Lord, 1994, p. 9). Hence low authoritarian individuals tend to be more independent and rely more upon their own rationality to support their judgment than do their high authoritarian counterparts, whose decisions are more likely to be influenced by their superior's intervention and desires.
In relation to a manager's project evaluation judgment, therefore, it is predicted that decisions made by low authoritarian project managers will be influenced mostly by the availability of information about the investment project, rather than the presence of obedience pressure. The aforementioned characteristics associated with low authoritarian individuals suggest that low authoritarian project managers are less sensitive and responsive to information from legitimate authority (e.g. obedience pressure), but more sensitive and responsive to information on the risks associated with their actions. They tend to consider different sides of the argument and put more effort into searching for additional relevant information related to the assigned tasks and their consequences. They may thus be more inclined to carry out instructions if they perceive possible benefits from doing so. When information about a failing project is publicly available, low authoritarian project managers will realize that their decision to go along with imposed instruction to continue the project will conflict with public desire for the termination of the project. On the other hand, a condition of private information hides the true state of the failing project. Under such conditions, the decision to go along with the pressure from above to continue tends to be more beneficial, since it can protect the project managers' current unfavorable performance from being revealed in the labor market.
Accordingly, it is expected that low authoritarian project managers are more likely to escalate their commitment to a failing project only under conditions of private information, regardless of whether they are subject to the presence or absence of obedience pressure. Stated formally, the following hypothesis is tested:
H3
Under private information conditions, low authoritarian project managers will exhibit a greater tendency to escalate commitment regardless of the extent of obedience pressure.
High authoritarian project managers, on the other hand, will be more agentic and more likely to perform activity-based instruction than are low authoritarian project managers. The presence of obedience pressure, which provides clear guidelines about the kind of task to carry out, may be enough to fulfill their expectations. This condition is somewhat exacerbated by their unwillingness to accept responsibility (Sanford, 1956). That is, by doing what they are instructed to, they tend to transfer responsibility back to their superior if their activities had negative consequences. Therefore it is expected that high authoritarian project managers may perceive obedience pressure as a primary factor in their decision to escalate commitment. Stated formally, the following hypothesis is tested:
H4
Under private information conditions, high authoritarian project managers will exhibit a greater tendency to escalate commitment when they are subject to the presence of obedience pressure than when no obedience pressure exists.
